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Atkinson v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 120 Nev. Ad. Op. 71 (2004).1 
 
TORTS – NEGLIGENCE PER SE  




 This case was an appeal from a final district court judgment, entered pursuant to a jury 
verdict in a personal injury case which denied appellant’s proffered jury instruction based on a 




 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case 
for a new trial finding that the district court incorrectly denied appellant’s jury instruction and 
that the jury instruction should have been given. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
            In the later part of 1997, MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (“MGM”) began constructing 
“high roller suites” in an area that had previously been tennis courts and a swimming pool.  
MGM hired the construction company, Marnell Corrao (“Marnell”), for the project.  Marnell 
secured the perimeter of the construction project with an eight-foot chain link fence and block 
walls.  However, the fence did not extend to block an entrance through a stairway leading from 
outside of the construction site to the interior.  Instead, planks and yellow caution tape were 
placed across the stairwell.  In addition to the planks and caution tape, MGM had security 
personnel check the construction site on an hourly basis to ensure that the site was secured. 
           On New Year’s Eve 1997, appellant Cherie Atkinson (“Atkinson”) walked an unknown 
number of steps and fell approximately twenty feet into an excavation on the premises of the 
MGM construction site.  Atkinson fractured her lumbar spine and incurred medical expenses in 
excess of $110,000.   
            Atkinson filed a complaint against MGM and Marnell, seeking damages for personal 
injuries sustained from her fall.  At the jury trial, Atkinson proposed a jury instruction 2 on the 
issue of negligence per se, based on NRS 455.010.3  The district court refused Atkinson’s 
instruction and the jury returned a verdict for MGM and Marnell. 
                                                 
1 By Amanda Yen 
2 The proposed jury instruction provided:  
 
A violation of [NRS 455.010] constitutes negligence as a matter of law.  If you find that a 
party violated a law just read to you, it is your duty to find such violation to be negligence; 
and you should then consider the issue of whether that negligence was a proximate cause 
of injury or damage to the Plaintiff. 
 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. 455.010 states: 
 
Any person or persons, company or corporation, who shall dig, sink or excavate, or cause 
the same to be done . . . shall, during the time they may be employed in digging, sinking or 
Discussion 
 
I. Adequate Objection to Preserve on Appeal 
 
 NRCP 51 states that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto . . . stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
grounds of his objection.”4  However, it is not always necessary to make a formal objection to 
preserve a jury instruction issue for appeal.5   
 Atkinson did not object immediately after the district court stated that it would not 
provide the proposed instruction to the jury.  However, Atkinson did object to MGM’s jury 
instruction on the standard of care because she believed that NRS 455.010 provided the 
applicable standard of care that should have been set out in the jury instruction.  Atkinson had 
also provided the district court with a written brief on the issue of NRS 455.010’s relevance in 
her opposition to MGM and Marnell’s motion in limine.   
 Due to Atkinson’s brief on the relevance of NRS 455.010 and her objection on the record 
that she believed NRS 455.010 supplied the applicable standard of care, the Nevada Supreme 
Court determined she sufficiently complied with NRCP 51 to preserve the issue for appeal. 
 
II. The Jury Instruction 
 
 Atkinson argued that a violation of NRS 455.010 constitutes negligence per se 6.  NRS 
455.010 is intended to protect members of the public from falling into excavations.  Atkinson 
entered a construction site and fell into an excavation pit and is therefore within the class of 
persons that the statute was designed to protect and her injury the type the statute was intended to 
prevent.  
 Although MGM contended that Atkinson’s proffered jury instruction was not required 
under Boland v. Nevada Rock and Sand Co.7, the court found that the Boland was factually 
distinguishable from the present case. 8 
                                                                                                                                                             
excavating, or after they may have ceased work upon or abandoned the same, erect, or 
cause to be erected, good and substantial fences or other safeguards, and keep the same in 
good repair, around such works or shafts, sufficient to guard securely against danger to 
persons and animals from falling into such shafts or excavations.  
 
4 NEV. R. CIV. P. 51 (2004). 
5 See J.A. Jones Constr. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 120 Nev. 32, 38, 89 P.3d 1009, 1015 (2004); Barnes v. Delta 
Lines, Inc., 99 Nev. 688, 690 n.1, 669 P.2d 709, 710 n.1 (1983) (holding that the requirements of NRCP 51 are 
satisfied as long as the district court is provided with a citation to the relevant legal authority that supports the giving 
of the instruction). 
6 A statutory violation is negligence per se if the injured party belongs to the class of persons whom the statute was 
intended to protect, and the injury suffered is the type the statute was intended to prevent.  Barnes, 99 Nev. at 690, 
669 P.2d at 710. 
7111 Nev. 608, 894 P.2d 988 (1995). 
8 In Boland, a dirt bike rider who had already entered the excavation area could not argue for the application of NRS 
455.010 because he fell off the hill after he was already inside the excavation. The court held that it would not be 
reasonable to require fencing or other safety measures to be placed around a 320-acre gravel pit. Id. at 614, 894 P.2d 
at 992. 
 The court held that in the present case, MGM and Marnell were required to follow the 





 Although NRCP 51 requires a distinct objection in order for an issue to be raised on 
appeal, a formal objection is not always necessary to preserve a jury instruction issue for appeal. 
 Further, NRS 455.010 is intended to protect members of the public from falling into 
excavations or work shafts.  If the injured party proffering the proposed jury instruction belongs 
to the class of persons whom NRS 455.010 was intended to protect, and the injury suffered is the 
type the statute was intended to prevent, than the district court should give the instruction to the 
jury.   
